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ABSTRACT
Each year, thousands of software vulnerabilities are discov-
ered and reported to the public. Unpatched known vulner-
abilities are a significant security risk. It is imperative that
software vendors quickly provide patches once vulnerabilities
are known and users quickly install those patches as soon as
they are available. However, most vulnerabilities are never
actually exploited. Since writing, testing, and installing soft-
ware patches can involve considerable resources, it would be
desirable to prioritize the remediation of vulnerabilities that
are likely to be exploited. Several published research studies
have reported moderate success in applying machine learn-
ing techniques to the task of predicting whether a vulnerabil-
ity will be exploited. These approaches typically use features
derived from vulnerability databases (such as the summary
text describing the vulnerability) or social media posts that
mention the vulnerability by name. However, these prior
studies share multiple methodological shortcomings that in-
flate predictive power of these approaches. We replicate key
portions of the prior work, compare their approaches, and
show how selection of training and test data critically affect
the estimated performance of predictive models. The results
of this study point to important methodological considera-
tions that should be taken into account so that results reflect
real-world utility.
∗This work is sponsored by the Intelligence Advanced Re-
search Projects Activity (IARPA) in the Office of the Direc-
tor of National Intelligence (ODNI) under Air Force Con-
tract FA8702-15-D-0001. The United States Government
is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for gov-
ernmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright annota-
tion hereon. The views and conclusions contained herein are
those of the authors and should not be interpreted as nec-
essarily representing the official policies or endorsements,
either expressed or implied, of IARPA or the United States
Government.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the
author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission
and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
IWSPA’17, March 24 2017, Scottsdale, AZ, USA
c© 2017 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.
ISBN 978-1-4503-4909-3/17/03. . . $15.00
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3041008.3041009
Keywords
Software Vulnerabilities; Exploit Prediction; Machine Learn-
ing
1. INTRODUCTION
Thousands of software vulnerabilities are discovered and
reported to the public every year. Once a vulnerability be-
comes public, the odds of it being exploited increase drasti-
cally [3], making unpatched disclosed vulnerabilities a signif-
icant security risk. Software vendors are generally quick to
provide patches once vulnerabilities are known, and vigilant
users are quick to install those patches as soon as they are
available. However, writing, testing, and installing patches
can involve considerable resources, requiring organizations
to prioritize vulnerabilities based on some notion of risk.
Because most software vulnerabilities are never actually ex-
ploited [10], it would be desirable to consider the probability
that they will be exploited as part of the risk assessment
process.
Several previous studies have characterized the exploita-
tion of disclosed vulnerabilities. Bilge and Dumitras [3]
found that “after vulnerabilities are disclosed publicly, the
volume of attacks exploiting them increases by 5 orders
of magnitude”. They also found that “exploits for 42% of
all vulnerabilities employed in host-based threats are de-
tected in field data within 30 days after the disclosure date.”
This result illustrates the risk posed by unpatched software
vulnerabilities, the need for software vendors and users to
quickly provide and install patches and the impact of a fail-
ure to patch.
However, Nayak et. al. [10] find that only 15% of the
known vulnerabilities in a set of popular software products
(i.e. MS Windows, MS Office, Internet Explorer, Adobe
Reader) are ever exploited “in the wild” (i.e. among com-
puters used by the general public [15]). They also find that a
small subset of vulnerabilities contribute disproportionately
to attacks. This finding suggests that not all vulnerabilities
carry the same risk and thus software makers and system
administrators could benefit from a method for prioritizing
their response to disclosed software vulnerabilities.
Frei et al. [6] study the lifecycle of vulnerabilities includ-
ing creation, discovery, disclosure, exploit availability, patch
availability and patch installation. They describe the ma-
jor players in a “security ecosystem” and how the motives of
the different players result in different orderings of the mile-
stones in the vulnerability lifecycle. Their empirical results
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show that in most years over 70% of all exploited vulnera-
bilities have exploits available at the time of disclosure.
While there are many sources of data on software vulnera-
bilities a few deserve special mention due to their ubiquity in
research and practice. The Common Vulnerabilities and Ex-
posures (CVE) dictionary, maintained by the MITRE Cor-
poration, is an authoritative source of identifiers for publicly
known information security vulnerabilities [9]. The National
Vulnerability Database (NVD) is a “repository of standards
based vulnerability management data”produced by the U.S.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [11].
The NVD is a superset of the CVE dictionary and is auto-
matically synchronized with it. The Common Vulnerability
Scoring System (CVSS) is an“open framework for communi-
cating the characteristics and impacts of IT vulnerabilities”
[7]. While CVSS has several components, the CVSS Base
Score is the most widely used. The CVSS Base Score is given
on scale from 0 to 10, calculated from a vector of categorical
variables that reflect the characteristics of the vulnerability.
For lack of a better method, the CVSS Base Score is com-
monly used as an indicator of risk and this practices has
been codified in some industry security standards [2]. How-
ever, Allodi and Massacci show that the CVSS base score
alone is a very poor indicator of whether a vulnerability is
likely to be exploited in the wild [2]. They find that the ex-
istence of a proof-of-concept exploit and the existence of an
exploit traded in cybercrime black markets are much more
indicative of the risk of exploitation.
2. RELATEDWORK
Several studies have attempted predict with machine learn-
ing techniques whether disclosed software vulnerability will
be exploited. Bozorgi et. al. [4] use features derived from
the Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) and CVE
to train a support vector machine (SVM) classifier. As
ground truth they use the OSVDB “Exploit Classification”
status, coding as positive any entries listed as “available,
rumored or private exploit”. Their dataset contains vulner-
abilities disclosed from 1991–2007. They report classifica-
tion accuracy approaching 90% in offline experiments using
a resampled, balanced data set. They also experiment with
online exploit prediction, where classifiers are repeatedly
trained with all vulnerabilities seen up to a point in time,
and find that classification accuracy stabilizes near 85%. In-
terestingly, 73% of the vulnerabilities in their data set are
labeled as exploited (N=13,765), which contrasts with other
surveys and datasets [2, 10, 5, 13] that show most vulnera-
bilities are not exploited.
Edkrantz and Said [5] apply several machine learning algo-
rithms to the task of classifying which vulnerabilities will be
exploited. They use vulnerability records from the NVD as
a source of features. They use the presence of an exploit in
Exploit Database (EDB) [1] that references a CVE-ID as a
source of ground truth for their study. (Exploit Database is
an archive of software exploits maintained by the company
Offensive Security.) In their overall dataset, which covers
the years 2005 through 2014, 27% of vulnerabilities are la-
beled as positive (N=55,914). They report 83% accuracy
on a balanced test set using SVM with a linear kernel (with
slightly worse results using Random Forest and Na¨ıve Bayes
classifiers).
Building on the work of Bozorgi [4], Sabottke et al. [13]
use linear SVM classifiers to predict which vulnerabilities
will be exploited, but instead of using features generated
from the vulnerability description text in the NVD database,
they substitute the text of Twitter posts (tweets) that refer-
ence a particular CVE-ID. In addition to predicting public
“proof-of-concept” exploits that are found in databases such
as EDB, they consider prediction of “real-world” exploits,
based on Symantec anti-virus and intrusion detection signa-
tures, and private proof-of-concept exploits, based on Mi-
crosoft’s Exploitability Index. While their data is restricted
to the one-year period from January 2014 to January 2015,
it is notable that the class ratios are starkly different than
in Bozorgi. While the majority of vulnerabilities in the Bo-
zorgi data are labeled as exploited, only 6.2% of vulnerabili-
ties in Sabottke’s dataset have corresponding private proof-
of-concept exploits and only 1.3% have real-world exploits
(N=5865).
3. CHALLENGESOFREALISTICEXPLOIT
PREDICTION AND SYSTEM EVALUA-
TION
Machine learning techniques for classification present a
compelling approach for the task of predicting which soft-
ware vulnerabilities will be exploited due to their ability
to discover complex patterns within high-dimensional data.
However, care must be taken in selecting training and test
data and generating features so that the results will be repre-
sentative of performance when used for online prediction to
aid enterprise network defenders. We consider several issues
that critically affect the evaluation of predictive models and
offer suggestions for evaluation that will more readily trans-
late to real-world performance. These challenges are realis-
tic class balance, appropriate seperation of training and test
data, representative and realistic test data and meaningful
benchmarks.
In their work surveying the field of intrusion detection,
Sommer and Paxson [14] examine why machine learning ap-
proaches have not been widely deployed despite extensive
academic research. They describe a number of challenges
that make this domain particularly difficult, including the
difficulty of evaluation, and offer guidelines that they hope
will improve the utility of research. Exploit prediction in-
volves many of the same challenges and adds the additional
difficulty of forecasting future events rather than detecting
ongoing attacks. In a similar vein, Rossow et al. describe
many of the pitfalls that can limit the correctness and real-
ism of experiments using malware [12]. While the context is
different from that of exploit prediction, several of the issues
they discuss echo findings in this work, including the appro-
priate seperation of training and evaluation data, removing
moot samples, the appropriate balance of classes and use of
real-world data.
A variety of metrics are commonly used to evaluate the
performance of a classifier, such as accuracy, precision, recall
and F1 score. These are summarized in Table 1. Accuracy
is the fraction of predictions that are correct. While it is
good to have high accuracy, its drawback as a performance
metric is that it fails to distinguish between different types
of prediction errors. Conflating the different types of error
can be misleading when their costs are different or when the
class ratios are highly imbalanced. For example, when the
classes are highly imbalanced, it becomes increasingly trivial
Metric Formula Description
Accuracy TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
Fraction of predictions that are correct
Precision TP
TP+FP
Fraction of positive predictions that are correct
Recall TP
TP+FN
Fraction of cases with the positive condition that are correctly predicted
F1 2 ∗ precision∗recall
precision+recall
Harmonic mean of Precision and Recall
Table 1: Classification performance metrics. The following abbreviations are used: TP - true positives, TN - true negatives,
FP - false positives, FN - false negatives
to achieve high prediction accuracy by simply predicting the
majority class in every case.
Using precision and recall together distinguishes between
the impact of errors that are false positives from those that
are false negatives. Precision is defined as the fraction of
positive predictions that are correct and highlights the effect
of false positives. Recall is defined as the fraction of cases
with the positive condition that are correctly predicted and
highlights the effect of false negatives.
The F1 metric is the harmonic mean of precision and re-
call and provides a single number that summarizes the per-
formance of a classifier. As there is an inherent trade-off
between precision and recall, most classifiers can be tuned
to select an operating point that is optimized for a particular
application. Precision-recall curves (e.g. Figure 2) summa-
rize graphically this trade-off for the range of possible values
of recall.
3.1 Class Imbalance
The ratio of class labels is an important consideration in
training and evaluating a classifier. It is generally more diffi-
cult to build a classifier that performs well on both precision
and recall when the class ratio is highly imbalanced. Perfor-
mance measured on an artificially balanced dataset will gen-
erally not be representative of performance when the classes
are imbalanced. Therefore, it is essential to evaluate a clas-
sifier on a test set that is representative of the true class
ratios; otherwise, the results will be misleading.
3.2 Train/Test Split
A common practice when developing machine learning
models is to split a labeled dataset into two parts, one for
training the model and another that is reserved exclusively
for evaluating the performance of the model. A typical
method is to partition the data randomly. This is a best
practice when the samples can be assumed to be mutually
independent and drawn from the same probability distribu-
tion; however, this assumption is not strictly true in the case
of exploit prediction. While some violations of this assump-
tion may be acceptable, it can be problematic in the case
of predictive analytics to train models based on information
that is available only in the future. For example, if a new
term is coined in the future to describe something about the
positive class, it is not reasonable to assume that a model
could learn a feature that accounts for its presence based
on past training data. Temporal intermixing of training and
test data violates this common sense assumption, and allows
information about the future to“leak” into the model. While
this could be rationalized as simply ignoring the effects of
concept drift, accounting for the impact of concept drift is a
critical aspect of evaluating any candidate predictive model.
3.3 Representative and Realistic Data
In addition to the issues mentioned above, it is impor-
tant that the data represent the task faithfully in other re-
spects. In the case of exploit prediction, the goal is to pre-
dict whether a vulnerability will be exploited in the future.
However, many vulnerabilities are known to be exploited at
the time of disclosure. Predicting whether such vulnerabil-
ities will be exploited is not a meaningful task and these
cases should not be included as test samples. Similarly, it is
important to consider whether a realistic system would be
operating in a batch mode, where many historical examples
are considered at one time, or an online mode, where each
sample is classified as it arrives. Some features that can
be calculated retrospectively in a batch setting use informa-
tion that might not be available in an online setting, which
is more representative of real predictive analytics applica-
tions. For example, if vulnerabilities were to be classified at
the time of disclosure, information about the elapsed time
between record creation and any subsequent record modifi-
cations would not be available.
3.4 Meaningful Benchmarks
Reporting that a particular technique achieves a certain
level of performance on a representative task is more useful
when given in the context of the next best alternative. Only
by doing so can actual progress be measured. Comparing
an approach to a na¨ıve model only shows that the approach
is not na¨ıve, not that it advances the state of the art in a
meaningful way
3.5 Examples from Related Work
Much of the prior work in exploit prediction takes an ap-
proach at odds with one or more the aforementioned prin-
ciples. Bozorgi [4] and Edkrantz [5] each evaluate their
methods using artificially balanced datasets, inflating per-
formance metrics. Edkrantz [5] and Sabottke [13] each ran-
domly split training and test data, allowing the temporal
intermixing of “future” and “past” data in the training and
test sets. Many of the most influential features in the model
used by Bozorgi [4] are derived from information that would
not be available in an online setting (though they do present
results from a simulated online experiment). Sabottke [13]
evaluates the utility of text-based features derived from so-
cial media, but never compares those results to using text
features derived from the vulnerability summary that is read-
ily available at the time of disclosure.
4. METHOD
In this study, we follow the outlines of prior work to build
a model to predict which software vulnerabilities will be ex-
ploited. However, our focus is on illustrating the impact of
the previously discussed challenges. To this end, we sys-
tematically vary the approach of selecting training and test
examples and generating features to highlight the effects on
prediction performance.
While our approach to training the baseline models fol-
lows many of the common aspects of previous work, we are
unable to precisely duplicate any particular study due to
the unavailability of data or a lack of detailed knowledge
about the methods used. (For example, OSVDB dataset
is no longer publicly accessible.) However, we find that our
baseline approach achieves results similar enough to be com-
parable, and we focus our attention on evaluating the effects
of controlled changes to the model building and evaluation
methodology.
We obtained data about published vulnerabilities from
the NVD, which indexes vulnerabilities by their CVE-ID [9].
Our dataset contained 38,129 vulnerabilities published be-
Name Type Count
CVSS
Access Vector C 3
Access
Complexity
C 3
Authentication C 3
Confidentiality
Impact
C 3
Integrity Impact C 3
Availability
Impact
C 3
Score N 1
CPE
Hardware Count N 1
OS Count N 1
Applications
Count
N 1
List T 2000
CWE
ID C 3
Name T 51
Description T 178
Number of
Parents
N 1
Parents C 30
Parents’ Names T 29
Parents’
Descriptions
T 108
References
Number N 1
Type T 3
Source T 42
URL T 2000
Summary Summary T 2000
Table 2: Summary of NVD features, types and counts. The
following abbreviations are used for the feature types: N -
Numeric, C - Categorical, T - Text. CVSS: Common Vul-
nerability Scoring System, CPE: Common Platform Enu-
meration, CWE: Common Weakness Enumeration.
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Figure 1: Vulnerability disclosures added to the National
Vulnerability Database (NVD) by month
tween 2009 and 2015. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the
disclosure dates over time. Each record includes a descrip-
tive text summary for the vulnerability, scores and metrics
from CVSS, information about affected products and ven-
dors, the category of vulnerability based on the Common
Weakness Enumeration (CWE) system, and URLs to other
reference sources. Table 2 contains a list of all data features
and their type (i.e. numeric, categorical or text).
The numeric CVSS score vulnerability is calculated from
the values assigned to the feature’s Access Vector, Access
Complexity, Authentication, Confidentiality Impact, Integrity
Impact, and Availability Impact. Access Vector can take on
the values “requires local access”, “adjacent network acces-
sible” or “network accessible”. Access Complexity can be
rated “high”, “medium” or “low”. Authentication can take
on the values“requires multiple instances of authentication”,
“requires single instance of authentication” or “requires no
authentication”. Confidentiality Impact, Integrity Impact,
and Availability Impact can be scored as “none”, “partial”
or“complete”. These numbers are used to calculate the over-
all, numeric CVSS score (see [7]).
Text features that had multiple entries for the same CVE-
ID, (i.e. the Vulnerable Systems List, Reference Types, Ref-
erence Sources, Reference URLs, CWE Names of Parents,
and CWE Descriptions of Parents) were concatenated to-
gether into one longer entry for that specific feature. The
counts of hardware, operating systems, and applications af-
fected were aggregated from the Vulnerable Systems List.
Each CWE has a name and description and there is a hi-
erarchy of CWEs, with CWE-IDs lower on the tree more
specific than those above.
We merged the NVD data with data from the Exploit
Database by CVE-ID. This data was then further pre-processed,
according to feature type. Numerical features were stan-
dardized to have zero mean and unit variance, categori-
cal features were represented using binary one-hot encod-
ings, and text features were represented using a bag-of-words
model. Each group of text features was individually mod-
eled using a separate term frequency-inverse document fre-
quency (TF-IDF) model, with a maximum of 2000 terms.
(We found there was minimal benefit in using more than
2000 terms.) Stop words were removed from all text features
and the terms“Exploit-DB”,“Milw0rm”, and“OSVDB”were
removed from the Reference Source. Reference URLs that
contained any of these three terms were completely removed.
These three sources are all databases detailing exploits and
they were excluded so as to not leak information about al-
ready known exploits into the model. While the presence
of these terms in the domain would be an obvious indicator
that the vulnerability had been exploited, other tokens asso-
ciated with the URL structure for each site could be equally
telling, thus we remove the entire URL before extracting
features.
For our ground truth labels, we used the presence of a
proof-of-concept (POC) exploit in the Exploit Database (EDB)
[1] to choose whether to mark a CVE as exploited or not.
CVE references to EDB are collected in a reference map at
[8] (2319 unique CVEs link to EDB); however, many more
EDB entries contain links to CVE-IDs that are missing from
this list. To compile a complete list, we used a web scraper
to check every EDB entry for a CVE link to generate a full
EDB–CVE mapping. This full mapping gave us a list of
19,864 unique CVE entries with POC exploits present in
the EDB. Of these, 6470 were within our target date range.
After splitting our data into training and test sets and pre-
processing our features, we trained a support vector machine
(SVM) classifier with a linear kernel on the training data.
We used the trained classifier to generate predictions on the
test set. Rather than make a hard classification decision for
each test sample and produce single point estimates of pre-
cision, recall, or accuracy, we use the raw output of the deci-
sion function to plot interpolated precision and recall plots,
which show the entire range of precision-recall performance
that would be achievable with the classifier depending on
the selected threshold.
Name Type Count
# tweets N 1
# with high friend count N 1
# with high follower count N 1
# retweets N 1
# favorited N 1
Ave # hashtags N 1
Ave # URLs N 1
Ave # mentions N 1
# verified N 1
Ave account Age N 1
Body T 2000
Table 3: Summary of Twitter-derived features, types and
counts. The following abbreviations are used for the feature
types: N - Numeric, T - Text.
For our experiments with Twitter data we collected tweets
from the Twitter API that contained the term“CVE”and se-
lected those tweets containing a valid CVE-ID. Our Twitter
collection covered the first 5 months of 2016. We then con-
sidered only those CVE records for which there was at least
one tweet in this time period (2712 in total). Because our
collection system only collects tweets containing the query
term “CVE”, and these can be expected to account for much
less than 1% of all Twitter traffic, we can reasonably assume
that our corpus contains all of the matching tweets over the
collection time period, despite the 1% rate limit imposed
by the Twitter API [17]. Our approach is very similar to
Sabottke. Although our data covers a different time period,
we find that the number of unique CVE-IDs in our corpus
relative to the collection duration is proportional to that of
Sabottke.
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Figure 2: Precision-recall plots showing effect of different
feature sets and class ratios on classification performance.
Table 3 describes the features, derived from [13], that were
used in these experiments in addition to the CVSS features
from Table 2. The statistical features are calculated from
the collection of tweets that reference a particular CVE-ID.
The lexical features are based on the concatenated text from
the bodies of the tweets. As before we use the presence of
the CVE-ID in EDB to assign the class label.
5. RESULTS
5.1 Experiment 1: Class Imbalance
To see the effects of class imbalance, we manipulated the
class ratio of our datasets by resampling from our original
data set, of which 17% of the vulnerabilities were exploited
(positive class). To make our results comparable to prior
work, we randomly split the data between training and test
sets, where 18% of the data was in the test set. The results
in Figure 2 and Table 4 show that performance was signifi-
cantly boosted by artificially generating balanced datasets.
Likewise, performance dropped further if the imbalance be-
came more severe, which may be realistic, as we discuss in
section 2. When the classes were balanced, performance ex-
ceeds the results reported by Edkrantz [5] and approaches
the results reported by Bozorgi [4].
5.2 Experiment 2: Randomized vs. Temporal
Train/Test Split
Batch
Random
Split
Batch
Temporal
Split
Online
Sliding
Window
Accuracy 0.904 0.902 0.874
Precision 0.742 0.466 0.553
Recall 0.651 0.342 0.564
F1 0.693 0.394 0.558
Table 5: Performance metrics for various training/test splits.
To see the effect of temporal intermixing of the train-
ing and test data, we compared splitting the data by date
(where all vulnerabilities disclosed after January 1, 2015,
All Features NVD Summary
50% Positive 17% Positive 3% Positive 50% Positive 17% Positive 3% Positive
Accuracy 0.841 0.904 0.968 0.809 0.895 0.967
Precision 0.841 0.743 0.566 0.811 0.736 0.582
Recall 0.845 0.651 0.362 0.802 0.577 0.171
F1 0.843 0.694 0.442 0.807 0.647 0.264
Table 4: Performance metrics for All Features and only NVD Summary for various class balances.
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Figure 3: Precision-recall plots comparing the method of
splitting training and test sets.
were placed in the test set), to randomly selecting an equiv-
alent portion of the data as the training set. Since all vul-
nerabilities published after January 1, 2015, accounted for
about 18% of the data, we also used 18% of the data in the
test set for the random split approach. We additionally eval-
uated an online approach where we trained on the first year
of data and evaluated on the subsequent six months of data.
We then added the test data to the training set, retrained
the model, and evaluated it on the following six months,
and so on. Figure 3 and Table 5 demonstrate that random
splitting of the training and test data substantially inflate
the performance of the predictive model. The results using
a sliding-window online approach are between the batch ap-
proaches, suggesting it is a reasonable approach that min-
imizes the negative effects of concept drift while properly
restricting training data to events that have occurred in the
past.
We note that the fraction of positive cases in the tempo-
rally split test set is only 9.3%, which is less than the 16.7%
of positive cases in the randomly split test set. This shows
that the class ratio in our data is not stable over time, and
it means that some of the decrease in performance is at-
tributable to the class imbalance being somewhat more ex-
treme when we use only the more recent data for evaluation.
However, given the quantitative results from our experiment
with class imbalance, this amount of change in the class ra-
tio is not enough to account for the majority of the effect
on performance. To further examine the difference in per-
formance between random and temporal splits, we looked
at the class separation achieved by the classifier decision
function learned with each type of split. Figure 4 shows sig-
nificantly more class separation in the random split case, as
compared to the temporal split case. The classifier was not
able to distinguish between the positive and negative classes
in the temporal spilt case as successfully as it was for the
random split, leading to the difference in performance.
5.3 Experiment 3: No Pre-exploited Vulnera-
bilities
It is important to measure the performance of a predictive
model on a task that is representative of the realistic situ-
ation. In many cases, exploits are published before or con-
currently with a vulnerability disclosure. Figure 5 shows a
histogram of the difference in days between vulnerability dis-
closure in the NVD database and exploits that target those
vulnerabilities being published in EDB. Most vulnerabilities
in the NVD that are exploited have already been exploited
by the time they are disclosed. Since a simple database
search can determine that these have been exploited, they
are not really candidates for prediction. When we excluded
these examples from the dataset we found that performance
was drastically reduced to a level not much better than
guessing. Since this also exacerbates the class imbalance,
we compared this performance to a dataset where a random
sample of the positive cases was removed so that the class
ratio was equivalent to the former case. We see in Figure 6
and Table 6 that while the effect of increasing the class im-
balance is substantial, performance is still much better than
when all of the previously exploited cases are removed.
Since the task of predicting the exploitation of disclosed
vulnerabilities is premised on the idea that exploits are com-
monly developed based on the vulnerability disclosures (“zero-
day” exploits being the obvious exception), it was surprising
to find such a large fraction of cases where the vulnerability
publication date is later than the earliest publication date of
a proof-of-concept exploit that references that vulnerability.
Appendix A describes how it is possible for an exploit to ref-
erence a vulnerability by its CVE-ID prior to its publication
and provides examples of specific CVEs. While an exploit
does exists at the time of vulnerability disclosure in many
cases, a limitation of our data is that it does not indicate
when any database updates that link the two may have oc-
curred, which would better indicate public knowledge about
the exploited status of a vulnerability. If such updates do
not always occur very soon after the vulnerability publica-
tion, then our approach of removing all vulnerabilities from
the dataset where the exploit is published prior to disclo-
sure might seem overly aggressive. On the other hand, if
we assume that any vulnerabilities can be quickly matched
to existing exploits, then using a simple database lookup on
past exploits as a classifier would achieve 100% precision at
59.3% recall on the full test set while ignoring any future ex-
ploit development. This suggests that any added value must
come by improving performance on the case where exploits
are not yet developed.
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Figure 4: Class separation for one realization of a random split (left) and a temporal split (right) for the NVD Summary text
only and using the top 2000 terms.
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Figure 5: Distribution of the difference in days between vul-
nerability disclosure and exploit publication
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Figure 6: Precision-recall plots illustrating the effect of re-
moving from the dataset any vulnerabilities with exploits
published prior to disclosure. The effect of resampling to
achieve a similar class ratio is shown for comparison.
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Figure 7: Precision-recall plots comparing the classification
performance using all features with performance using only
lexical features derived from the NVD summary text.
All Data
Points
Matching
Class Ratio
No Pre-disclosure
Exploits
Accuracy 0.909 0.959 0.956
Precision 0.519 0.458 0.171
Recall 0.334 0.105 0.027
F1 0.406 0.170 0.046
Table 6: Performance metrics for the full dataset, excluding
vulnerabilities which were exploited before being published
in NVD, and resampled to achieve a similar class ratio.
5.4 Experiment 4: Twitter Text vs. NVD Sum-
mary Text
All Features NVD Summary
Accuracy 0.902 0.897
Precision 0.466 0.426
Recall 0.342 0.311
F1 0.394 0.359
Table 7: Performance metrics for All Features and NVD
Summary features only.
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Figure 8: Precision-recall plots comparing classification per-
formance using features derived from Twitter to features
derived from the NVD summary text.
The lexical features derived from the NVD summary text
account for almost all of our classifier’s performance. Fig-
ure 7 and Table 7 show that all the other features combined
provide a very modest improvement, mainly when precision
is emphasized over recall.
Sabottke investigates using features derived from Twitter
to predict whether software vulnerabilities will be exploited.
They combine lexical features from the text of tweets men-
tioning CVEs with other statistical features from the Twit-
ter data and features from the NVD database. While using
social media appears to produce promising results, they do
not compare their results to a baseline approach of using
the lexical features in the NVD summary text. Figure 8
compares our results using features derived from the NVD
database (summary and CVSS scores) to our results using
features derived from Twitter along with the CVSS scores.
(The results using NVD text in this experiment differ from
Figure 7 due to using a different range of time.) We show the
results using only the lexical features as well as augmented
with most of the statistical features used by Sabottke. In
both cases, the model using Twitter features does not show
an improvement over the baseline model.
Collecting information about vulnerabilities from Twitter
involves a significant investment in data processing capabil-
ities, delays the time to make a prediction until the Twit-
ter community generates sufficient tweets, and can only be
applied to vulnerabilities that generate social media inter-
est. The open nature of the Twitter platform also poses a
greater risk of an adversary attempting to poison the defend-
ers training data, though this was investigated by Sabottke
[13] who found the impact would be modest under several
models of adversarial interference. Given these considera-
tions the marginal benefits of using social media would need
to be sufficient to justify the costs. Our results suggest that
such a benefit does not exist.
6. DISCUSSION
The results of the four experiments described in the previ-
ous section show that subtle changes in the evaluation pro-
cess can have a profound impact on the estimated perfor-
mance of a predictive system. Making more realistic choices
about class balance, how to split training and test data and
what constitues a realistic example for prediction lowered
the F1 score of our classifier from 83% to 4%. While the
appropriate choices for each of these dimensions is highly
dependent on the prediction task and training data, this ex-
ample illustrates why it is important to make realistic deci-
sions for each of them in order to get performance estimates
that are likely to translate to a pratical setting.
Our assessment of the value of predictions based on NVD
data is consistent with the results of Zhang et al. [18], who
attempt to use NVD data to predict the time until the next
undiscovered vulnerability is reported in a particular piece of
software. They conclude that data in the NVD generally has
poor predictive capability. One reason that NVD data may
have poor predictive power is the presence of substantial
concept drift (as seen in Figure 3), which makes it difficult to
generalize about future vulnerabilities based on descriptions
of past vulnerabilities.
We also find limited use for social media in predicting
whether software vulnerabilities will be exploited. While
we focus on the issue of performance relative to an estab-
lished baseline, Tufekci [16] describes several methodologi-
cal pitfalls, such as over-reliance on a single platform, un-
representative samples, and field effects that should also be
considered when using social media big data for predictive
analytics.
While models based on the open source database informa-
tion examined in this study led to poor prediction perfor-
mance, more accurate predictions might be possible by ex-
ploiting better sources of data. Developing richer or higher-
fidelity databases about vulnerabilities and exploits, perhaps
by collaboration with organizations that hold large amounts
of private data, is one approach that exploits the potential
of big data for security analytics. Another avenue might
be to use static or dynamic analysis of vulnerable code or
binaries to obtain greater insight into the fundamental ex-
ploitability of a particular vulnerability or its utility as a
target for exploitation. Exploring such approaches is left for
future work.
A limitation on effectiveness of any predictive system op-
erating in an adversarial environment is that its predictions
may influence future events, thereby undermining the appar-
ent accuracy of its predictions. For example, if predictions
about software exploitation become widely known and relied
upon, attackers may intentionally shift their focus to another
less defended target. Such an offensive strategy presumably
imposes some cost on attackers by pushing them towards less
desirable avenues of attack, so there is still some net bene-
fit to the defender for deploying the predictive system. This
limitation exists regardless of the mechanism used for predic-
tion, but systems based on machine learning may be quicker
to adapt to evolving attacker strategy than systems based
on manually developed rules. Exploring the co-evolution of
attacker and defender strategies and the impact on the ef-
fectiveness of defensive systems is also left to future work.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this study we identify several methodological consid-
erations that need to be accounted for during training and
evaluation of predictive models that will be used in practical
settings. Previous studies that have investigated predicting
exploits of disclosed software vulnerabilities have failed to
account for some or all of these issues. We show empirically
the impact of violating these principles on the task of exploit
prediction. We conclude that models of software vulnerabil-
ity exploitation based on NVD database entries and social
media alone are unlikely to have enough predictive power to
be useful in practice.
8. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Jeremy Blackthorne and Clark Wood for their
helpful feedback on drafts of this paper.
9. REFERENCES
[1] Exploit Database, May 2016. www.exploit-db.com.
[2] L. Allodi and F. Massacci. Comparing vulnerability
severity and exploits using case-control studies. ACM
Transactions on Information and System Security,
17(1):1, Aug 2014.
[3] L. Bilge and T. Dumitras¸. Before we knew it: an
empirical study of zero-day attacks in the real world.
In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pages
833–844, 2012.
[4] M. Bozorgi, L. K. Saul, S. Savage, and G. M. Voelker.
Beyond heuristics: learning to classify vulnerabilities
and predict exploits. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM
SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining, pages 105–113, 2010.
[5] M. Edkrantz and A. Said. Predicting cyber
vulnerability exploits with machine learning. In
S. Nowaczyk, editor, Thirteenth Scandinavian
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 48–57. IOS
Press, 2015.
[6] S. Frei, D. Schatzmann, B. Plattner, and B. Trammell.
Modeling the security ecosystem – the dynamics of
(in)security. In T. Moore, D. J. Pym, and
C. Ioannidis, editors, Economics of Information
Security and Privacy, pages 79–106. Springer, 2010.
[7] P. Mell, K. Scarfone, and S. Romanosky. A complete
guide to the Common Vulnerability Scoring System
version 2.0. Technical report, National Institute of
Standards and Technology and Carnegie Mellon
University, 2007. https://www.first.org/cvss/v2/guide.
[8] MITRE. CVE reference map for source
EXPLOIT-DB.
http://www.cve.mitre.org/data/refs/refmap/source-
EXPLOIT-DB.html.
[9] MITRE. Common vulnerabilites and exposures,
March 2016. cve.mitre.org.
[10] K. Nayak, D. Marino, P. Eftathopoulos, and
T. Dumitras¸. Some vulnerabilities are different than
others: studying vulnerabilities and attack surfaces in
the wild. In Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and
Defenses 2014, pages 426–446, 2014.
[11] N. I. of Standards and Technology. National
Vulnerability Database, March 2016. nvd.nist.gov.
[12] C. Rossow, C. J. Dietrich, C. Grier, C. Kreibich,
V. Paxson, N. Pohlmann, H. Bos, and M. Van Steen.
Prudent practices for designing malware experiments:
Status quo and outlook. In 2012 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, pages 65–79. IEEE, 2012.
[13] C. Sabottke, O. Suciu, and T. Dumitras¸. Vulnerability
disclosure in the age of social media: exploiting
Twitter for predicting real-world exploits. In
Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Security Symposium,
pages 1041–1056, 2015.
[14] R. Sommer and V. Paxson. Outside the closed world:
on using machine learning for network intrusion
detection. In 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, pages 305–316, 2010.
[15] Symantec. What is a virus in the wild?
http://www.pctools.com/security-news/virus-in-the-
wild/.
[16] Z. Tufekci. Big questions for social media big data:
representativeness, validity and other methodological
pitfalls. In Proceedings of the Eighth International
Conference on Weblogs and Social Media, pages
505–514, 2014.
[17] Twitter. Twitter streaming API.
https://dev.twitter.com/streaming/public.
[18] S. Zhang, D. Caragea, and X. Ou. An empirical study
on using the national vulnerability database to predict
software vulnerabilities. In Database and Expert
Systems Applications 22nd International Conference,
pages 217–231, 2011.
APPENDIX
A. VULNERABILITIESWITHPRE-EXISTING
EXPLOITS
The median difference in time between exploit publica-
tion and vulnerability publication in our dataset is 8 days,
but there are many individual cases where this gap is much
larger. One might ask how it is possible to reference a vul-
nerability by its CVE-ID prior to its publication. One expla-
nation is that CVE-IDs can be allocated prior to publication
in the NVD database. This would allow a security researcher
who finds a vulnerability to reserve a CVE-ID, publish their
proof of concept exploit and then publish the vulnerability,
in that order. (The researcher may also disclose the vul-
nerability privately to the vendor prior to public disclosure
in accordance with responsible disclosure practices as de-
scribed by Frei. [6]) An example that seems to fit this pat-
tern is CVE-2015-4414, a directory-traversal vulnerability
in a WordPress audio plugin that allows an attacker to read
arbitrary files on the system. The CVE-ID for this vulner-
ability was reserved on 7 June 2015. An exploit (EDB-ID:
37274) that references this CVE-ID was published on EDB
on 12 June 2015. The vulnerability was published on the
NVD on 17 June 2015.
The record of an exploit might also be updated after
its initial publication to reference a vulnerability that is
subsequently published. This may be because the exploit
author did not disclose the vulnerability and thus didn’t
know the CVE-ID prior to the vulnerability publication. It
may be that a newly discovered vulnerability is readily ex-
ploited using an existing exploit with only a trivial modifica-
tion. An example of the later case is CVE-2011-5289, pub-
lished in the NVD on 31 December 2014, which exploits the
SaveDecrypted method in the aTube Catcher ActiveX con-
trol to write arbitrary files. This vulnerability is referenced
in EDB by an exploit (EDB-ID: 6963), which was published
on 3 November 2008. This exploit also references an earlier
vulnerability (CVE-2008-5002), published on 10 November
2008. This vulnerability affects the same ActiveX control
and allows an attacker to overwrite arbitrary files via the
WriteFile method.
